Introduction and Notes. South Bend: St. Walz, Matthew.
The department has developed interests in the metaphysics and ethics of Aristotle and Plato. Mirus, Chris. The department has developed interests in the ontology of the work of art, the history of aesthetics, the philosophy of music, and the intersection of art and the phenomenology of perception and nature.
Interstitial Soundings. Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, Palgrave Macmillian, Placing Aesthetics: Studies in the Philosophic Tradition. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, The department has developed interests in virtue theory, applied ethics, and natural law. John A. Murley et al, Wilhelmsen , ed. James Lehrberger et al, New York: Peter Lang , The Catholic University of America Press, Simmons, Lance.
The department has developed interests in ancient, medieval, and contemporary approaches to metaphysics. Washington, D. Albany, N. The department has developed interests in the philosophy of education, the metaphysics of personhood, embodiment, and race. Frank, William, translator. With Introduction and Notes. Preface by Rocco Buttiglione. South Bend, Ind. Anton Rauscher, Sarah Tyson and Joshua M. Hall, Search strategy outcomes. The result of the reviewed articles, were used as a codes to identify, summaries synthesis and discuss of findings for clarifying the interpretation themes.
Thirteen relevant articles have been reviewed. From each article the following data have been extracted: domain, title, author, study aim, strength of evidence and findings; all articles presented in Appendix. The authors relate and interpret the research findings to identify themes based on their domains similarities.
Overall, the thirteen reviewed research articles published between and ; all of the nursing studies were guided by hermeneutic phenomenology. All of the articles are presented in Appendix. Nursing education is an important area of research that can be studied using qualitative approaches  ; such as educational experiences, developing cultural sensitivity, or the effect of evaluation on student performance in the clinical setting. Four studies concerned with lived experience in nursing education revealed multiple themes which have significant role in nursing practice. The study of Ransea et al.
Also, the students demonstrated family-centered care but recounted unexpectedness in both the dying trajectory and physical changes in the dying patient. The second study of Packard and Hoffman  calling the hermeneutic circle: A Place of Belonging to the Pre-Nursing Students shown that themes of longing, belonging, vulnerability, and comfort emerge, in which being in caring circles offers radical possibilities for a pedagogy of being and becoming in nursing education.
While the third study of Coatsworth et al. The study themes were student nurses experienced: growth of their nursing capabilities; volunteering as building empathy, compassion and caring; education and health promotion within their nursing identity; the need to use creativity in overcoming barriers to delivering health care effectively, and experienced gaining new capabilities to utilize in Australia. Their study aimed to understand how one group of undergraduate nursing students perceived their experiences of the transition into higher education and nursing.
Five themes emerged from the data: uncertainty; expectations; learning to survive; seeking support; and moving forward. The undergraduate students of the first year had demonstrated developing self-efficacy and successful transition. Regarding the second part of practice; phenomenology as a qualitative research method has been used to realize a variety of practice-related experiences and enables understanding of personal interactive experiences     .
The study of Valizadeh et al. While the main themes that have been emerged from Mendes  in the study of the impact of critical illness news on the family; revealed several themes; unexpected news death of the sick person impact the well-being, care of family members, and their ability for analysis and decision making. Blomberg et al. Imani et al. The three subthemes were: resorting to spiritualties, self-protection and intelligent resilience.
The study of lived experiences of elderly patients with Coronary Artery Disease of Karimooi et al. However, Bright  had explored and examined the phenomenon of nursing presence through the hermeneutic lenses. Theoretical categories include: narrative identity, play and solicitude, whereas, Koskinen and Nystrom  contributed to the development of the hermeneutical application research design in its epistemological, ontological and ethical perspective, by articulating and clarifying the central foundations in the application.
Theory of caring become evident and implemented in a clinical practice through moments when the participants find a common understanding and consensus on the knowledge of care and caring. The qualitative research literature addressing issues uniquely related to nursing administration is limited, possibly because many of the issues that lend themselves to qualitative education in nursing administration overlap with the practice arena .
The first study of Thompson et al. Participants proposed that they are isolated and excluded from the rest of the healthcare workforce group. These issues led participants to feel uncertain about work identity, while last study of Liden et al. The finding revealed is presented in two themes. The first, feeling that the symptoms overwhelm life.
The role of healthcare professionals in the interpretative process should be acknowledged as a conventional and necessary care activity. Utilizing hermeneutic phenomenology for nursing practice, education, and administration has made a significant contribution to the substantive body of nursing knowledge. Qualitative methods acceptance as effective approaches to nursing knowledge discovery continues to develop; evidenced by increasing nursing research guided by hermeneutic phenomenology; to investigate phenomena of interest experiences.
Education Domain: The study of Ranse et al. When reflecting on experiencing loss, students questioned their own actions, acknowledged the value of relationships and identified ways to cope. Regarding the study of Coatsworth et al. Additionally, the participants were forced to enact their nursing skills to the very boundaries of their capabilities and to be more innovative.
Practice Domain: Experience of working with new nurses, working experiences with chronic daises ill patients, adapting to new strategies as emotional intelligence in nursing practice are central phenomenon to nursing practice that can be enriched when examined from a qualitative lens. Therefore, phenomena unique to the practice of professional nursing need investigative approaches suitable to their unique nature . Valizadeh et al. They felt that the workload involved in the preceptorship role was often underestimated and new nurses were assumed as full working forces.
On the hand, the preceptors were critiqued for shortcomings and errors caused by new nurses. Mendes,  study of the humanity of nurses was revealed in response to the needs of the family. In view of the requirements for information, it was verified that the information transmitted allowed them to become aware of themselves, to become empowered in their daily lives and to alleviate the emotional burden experienced.
While Blomberg et al. A new understanding emerged that the operating theatre nurses always have the patient in mind. Karimooi et al. After the disease, they were trying to achieve calmness through some strategies. Members of the treatment team, especially nurses should provide self-care education for to make them be having successfully in this field. And by this may enhance to achieve calmness through some strategies to make them behaving successfully. While; Bright  has clarified the role of ethical orientation, creativity and connection with the human experience through exploration of self and other.
When theoretical understanding turns into praxis, knowledge also becomes activity and theory and practice become one. Administration Domain: Studies related to professional nurse behavior and work activities, satisfaction, successful leadership strategies, and perspectives on nurse empowerment would cross over between administration and practice and little. Thompson et al. When work activities and professional group identity do not align with role expectations, as can be the case for nursing home nurses, work identity may be compromised.
These nurses may attempt to change work practices to strengthen their work identity. While last study of Liden et al. Their efforts to describe their symptoms to healthcare professionals are part of this reflection and search for meaning. Evidently, practice-related research domain is growing and expanding into various nursing areas, with significant and extensive development of related-researches in education and administration domains.
As we indicated, he is working toward a different understanding of existence itself. Whether it is characterized by pleasure or suffering, need is the very ground of that existence. The priority of present-time, concentrated into an extended now-moment is opened up through sensibility and affectivity. In pleasure as in pain, we need —not out of lack—but in desire or in hope. Levinas approaches that presence through modalizations provided by sensations and affects that were unexplored by either Heidegger or Husserl.
In , Levinas was convinced that through sensation and states of mind we also discover the futility of getting out of existence. In the physical torment of nausea, we experience being in its simplest, most burdensome neutrality. To this, Levinas adds three provocative themes.ignamant.cl/wp-includes/76/3516-como-leer-mensajes.php
Second, nausea is not simply a physiological event. It shows us dramatically how existence can encircle us on all sides, to the point of submerging us. As Rolland observes, in that case social and political life may also nauseate us. Being is existence, and it is firstly our existence. The mark of creaturely existence is need and, by extension, a struggle with being.
Emmanuel Levinas (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Levinas concludes polemically,. The question remains: how shall we best think through the sensuous need to transcend being? Embodied need is not an illusion; is transcendence one? Levinas will answer this question fully in In Existence and Existents and Time and the Other , being now has a dual aspect, of light and of dark indeterminacy.
It is as though being were divided between the being of a created world and the darkness out of which light was brought. We fall asleep, curled about ourselves, thereby exiting our conscious existence. Embodied consciousness thus begins and ends with itself. As such, it is both dependent on and independent from its environment, and Levinas will urge that the subject, upon awakening, uses and masters being.
In the middle period essays, the partial transcendences of pleasure and desire, already sketched in , receive fuller development and variations. The son incarnates alterity in a curious way. He is, in a sense, his father and not his father. However, his birth opens a focus on the future. No longer conceived as one of open possibilities, as Heidegger had argued, the time opened by the son responds to two basic limitations on our understanding and representation: death and the other person. But even as such it escapes everyday understanding. Hence Levinas will qualify death as an alterity as radical as that of the other human being who confronts me.
In death the existing of the existent is alienated. To be sure, the other that is announced does not possess this existing as the subject possesses it; its hold over my existing is mysterious. It is not unknown but unknowable. TO: Of course, we can and do constitute the other an alter ego. Yet such constitution by phenomenological analogy never exhausts his fundamental difference TO: 78— Two reversals should be noted, here, relative to The second reversal concerns moods themselves. In Heidegger, anxiety, joy, and boredom were states of mind, with anxiety as the privileged mood by which humans are confronted with themselves, their lack of ground, and with the question of their existence.
In his middle period, Levinas will expand the experience of being to moods now including horror. Nighttime being reveals an indeterminate dark presence that is not pure nothing. Once again, Levinas recurs to bodily states, this time including fatigue, indolence, insomnia, and awakening. In the first three, the aforementioned gap between the embodied self and the intentional I increases. Upon awakening, the embodied ego soi-moi reasserts its mastery over things and even its own bodily torpor.
Consequently, intelligibility is well figured by light. Phenomenological evidence is guaranteed by lighted circumstances—albeit for someone. Thus, if being is equated with illumination, for Levinas it must also include the dark anonymity of night EE: Consequently, the question that inaugurates fundamental ontology: Why is there being instead of simply nothing?
Nothingness, understood as pure absence, may be thinkable, but it cannot be experienced. Over the course of his analyses, this self-ego will hearken to a call. However, the call comes not from being but from an alterity that Levinas compares with death itself.
Husserl understood transcendence in several ways, of which one significant dimension was that typical of consciousness extending toward, and encountering, the worldly objects at which it aims. After Husserl, Heidegger will define transcendence as the essence of our existing in the world; Da-sein is always already in the world among things, according to a worldly transcendence or being out-there. For Levinas, these senses of transcendence are acceptable but not primary. Instead, he aligns transcendence with exteriority, in the sense of what lies outside myself but eludes my comprehensive knowledge: the other person TI: But this other speaks to me, implores or commands me.
In responding, I discover my responsibility to them. This is the ground of ethics or indeed our concern with ethics as the good of the other person. As Levinas argues, when ethics goes in search of its existential ground, before any consideration of utility, virtue, or duty, it discovers the intersubjective enactment of responsibility, which resists being integrated into accounts in which the other is a universal other to whom it is my duty, for example, to act ethically or in the hope of increasing the happiness of the collectivity.
Utility, virtue, and duty are crucial to ethical debates. Yet Levinas is pointing to their common lived origin in the irreducibility of the face-to-face encounter. He reminds us that Levinas is working at a pre-theoretical and embodied level that represents the impetus behind ethical systems forged through reflection, tradition, and critique.
At the same time, I respond to that other. As Levinas writes,. Already Husserl argued that the objectivity of thought consists in being valid for everyone. To know objectively is therefore to constitute my thought in such a way that it already contain[s] a reference to the thought of others. What I communicate therefore is already constituted in function of others. TI: , emph. We can even note parallels between Levinas and some contemporary ethicists.
Moral intuitionists like David Wiggins and John McDowell have, similarly to Levinas, focused on our sensibility when it comes to grasping moral truths. In discussing authentic education, McDowell argues that acquiring an ethical sensibility makes possible our intuitions of what is right and good. It even fosters a flourishing rational will able to discern bona fide ethical requirements McDowell , Wiggins .
Both McDowell and Wiggins share with Levinas an effort to enrich the perspective on the subject as a purely rational agent, although Levinas reconstructs the intersubjective, existential origins of that agency. Despite this difference, however, Morgan and Jean-Michel Salanskis have both underscored the importance—for the justification of any ethics—of scrutinizing its existential conditions.
These are:. Salanskis 63, my trans. If ethics refers to the study or to a system of moral principles, then Levinas provides a phenomenology of the everyday genesis of these principles. Respect is thus a unique affect that motivates my will to follow the moral law, though it is not a feeling in an empirical psychological sense Kant .
Instead, it is something that affects me, and Basterra compares it to the affection that Levinas identifies as the interruption of my activity by the other who faces me Basterra Once again, the two philosophies are different, notably because they entail distinct approaches. Totality and Infinity unfolds around phenomenological descriptions of being, depicted initially as nature or forces in conflict TI: 21— However, our being in-the-world also entails the enjoyment of natural elements and love of life TI: — Levinas also reframes labor as the creation of a store of goods thanks to which the other can be welcomed TI: —, , rather than solely as the mastery or humanization of nature.
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Instead, we live nourished and can receive the other into our space. On the basis of these descriptions, transcendence as defined above comes to pass in several stages. Intersubjective dialogue entails conversation, teaching, and at a more general level, literary or philosophical discourse TI: 51, 57, —52, Over the course of this expansion, the trace of responsibility is attenuated and conundrums arise concerning the well-being of other s and conflicts within the community.
These require deliberations about justice and fairness. For instance: what does justice for the other s mean? Should it above all concern the reparation of wrongs? Can responsibility for an other coexist with disinterested equity? Or is justice ultimately in service to the stronger and opposed to responsibility? Aristotle himself defined the combination of the two as complete virtue Nicomachean Ethics , a, and b7— Rather than pursuing justice as it is refined through civil society into the State, Levinas focuses on a smaller-scale institution, the family, arguably common to all humanity.
It is presumably in the family rather than in the State that the responsibility described in the face-to-face encounter is most clearly enacted. If the family is consolidated by the birth of the child, then, as Levinas puts it, it is the father who elects and calls the child to responsibility, just as the child grows up serving his siblings in a way more personal than that prescribed by the impersonal justice of States.
Totality and Infinity does not devote attention to clock time or to the time of universal or Hegelian history. Levinas would be the last, however, to deny the self-interest of our drives and instincts. Yet Levinas also envisions an alternative history in which it is possible to bear witness to wrongs undergone by persons.
These wrongs may not be recorded in the official history of governments, but their attestation prolongs the discussion of human sensibility invested by responsibility. Levinas writes,. History is worked over by the ruptures of history, in which a judgment is borne upon it. When man truly approaches the Other he is uprooted from history. TI: The thesis of the primacy of history constitutes an option for the comprehension of being in which interiority is sacrificed. The present work proposes another option TI: Indeed, whereas Heidegger gradually translated his conception of the silent call of being to Da-sein into the notion of the event Ereignis in the s, Levinas makes his interruption an intersubjective affair or rather the basis of ethical intersubjectivity.
Nevertheless, Levinas does argue that the encounter with alterity may leave a trace in historical time. Flowing out of the temporal interruptions that leave affective mnemonic traces in persons, the ground of social existence in Levinas does not resemble the solipsism for which Heidegger was sometimes criticized. As individuals, we are always already in social relations, marked by a remainder of responsibility.
We have always already been impacted by the expression or face of an other. We carry on, in our respective spheres, apparently motivated by desires and projects, some of which entail the kind of quests for mastery and recognition that Hegel described. This under-layer of our everyday desires comes to light in the faltering of our will to mastery as experienced in the face-to-face encounter. As indicated, it is dual: a command and a summons.
It opposes a passive resistance to our desire for mastery wherein our freedom asserts its sovereignty TI: While these are biblical figures, he argues that we encounter them concretely even before transcribing them into religious allegory TI: 76— Indeed they invest our freedom as the possibility of giving. It is as summons and injunction that expression precipitates transcendence. If I am self-sufficient in my everyday activities and perception, then this is because I am a being that inhabits overlapping worlds in which my sway is largely decisive for me. The passive resistance of the face alters this sway through an affective mood not unlike one Levinas had explored in shame.
In shame, we experience our freedom as unjustifiable. It is impossible to set up a temporal order of succession or alternation between being and the good beyond being.
For humans, the good comes to pass almost trivially and in everyday contexts. Of course, as readily as responsibility and generosity may be glimpsed in human affairs, cruelty and competition are also obvious. However, that humans experience moments of inexplicable generosity, even enact them spontaneously, is a fact that would remain enigmatic within an ontology of competing drives or merely utilitarian desires.
In that respect, the trace of the good is present within existence as the possibility that something other than rivalries and instrumentalization take place intersubjectively. As he writes,. But to think what does not have the lineaments of an object is in reality to do more or better than think. So far as infinity has a positive sense, then, it has that sense as our unquenchable desire for sociality.
Rich with the accumulation of past experiences, intersubjective sensibility proves to be the locus of relationality and transcendence in In the fourteen years separating Existence and Existents and Time and the Other from Totality and Infinity , we see both continuities and differences. By , it is the experience of the face-to-face encounter that destabilizes the a priori - a posteriori dichotomy by urging that, in the face-to-face, the third party humanity looks at me through the eyes of the other.
Consciousness always takes up after these instants of interruption and reconnects itself as a homogeneous flow. Thus the good beyond being is not radically separated from existence in Consequently and to repeat, this affair is a human one. Any philosophical translation of concrete embodied life must therefore approach the human subject as it emerges through its relations with others, even though the intersubjective situation entails both my particularization through election and a loss of egoic mastery.
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It could thus never be alone and must be approached existentially mp-PP: As we have seen, Levinas envisages being as constant, neutral presence and, at times, like a Hobbesian state of nature. That is why, in its natural expression, being takes on almost a mechanistic quality in Levinas.
In social and institutional senses, being is conceived as the encompassing of individuals and communities by the State. On the latter depend security and property, life and death. To be sure, Levinas was skeptical about deriving an ethics from ontology. Against Heidegger, Levinas understands this framing as tantamount to a hermeneutic universe in which the idea of our authentic possibility concerns only death and underestimates the significance of the encounter with the other person. Only through a different hermeneutics, which reveals human existence as embodied and interpersonal , can we conceptualize the opening to responsibility that the encounter with the other creates.
However, unlike Taylor, Levinas does not endorse a plurality of strong values, because the encounter with the other is the primary condition for him. Despite this, and in light of Totality and Infinity , she comes close to Trigano when she argues that Levinas tends to ignore important political questions, including that of the Jewish State, which has dire consequences for his thought, because. Batnitzky — Hence, in Totality and Infinity , the transition from the micro-sociality of the face-to-face encounter to social existence more broadly occurs through language as teaching and dialogue TI: —; — Despite this second path, the question remains how it is that, through the eyes of the other, the whole of humanity looks at me TI: Gillian Rose first criticized this limited universalization of responsibility as lacking important socio-political mediations By focusing on temporal mediations rather than social or spatial ones , Levinas does provide a partial universalization of responsibility by way of the aforementioned phenomenon of the family.
Introducing this discussion, Levinas admits:. The acuity of the problem [of universalization] lies in the necessity of maintaining the I in the transcendence [of the face-to-face] with which it hitherto seemed incompatible [given its self-interests]. That is, thanks to the time of generations, an ego surpasses itself through its children TI: Both Rose and Derrida have pointed toward the difficulty of introducing ethics into questions of justice and politics in this way Derrida [ , —]. Part of the difficulty here lies in the tension between universalization understood as the ethical cultivation of humanity, versus universalization understood as providing an ethical inflection to politics broadly conceived.
For Levinas, the passage of responsibility into politics is invariably fragile, because ethical language is frequently absorbed or imitated by political rhetoric. Yet, in , the question of how responsibility and election experienced in the family passes—without tribalism—into a vaster history and public space remains under-thematized; notably, as it concerns demands for social justice and equality. He argues,.
The very status of the human implies fraternity and the idea of the human race. Fraternity is radically opposed to the conception of a humanity united by resemblance, a multiplicity of diverse families arisen from the stones cast behind by Deucalion, and which, across the struggle of egoisms, results in a human city. This unification in difference is created only when monotheism results in a law that equalizes those obliged by it. And for many commentators, interpersonal responsibility remains the exception not the rule. Two dilemmas thus arise in Totality and Infinity.
It is an open question whether they are laid to rest in Otherwise than Being. They concern first the dichotomy between what was traditionally called free will versus nature, and second the socio-cultural mediations between families and States. In the first case, it may be surprising that Levinas characterizes human existence in terms resembling those of physiological determinism, that is, in terms of drives and the interests attaching to them.
For him, the problem of reconciling freedom and nature would above all be one of interrupting the activity of the drives, which is the bodily substrate of consciousness and contributes to its dynamic temporal unity. Understanding the will, then, does not begin with freedom so much as with something closer to conatus essendi or even to a will to power i. Levinas proves close to Kant here. Kant urged that Achtung be considered in its negative and positive aspects: negatively, as attention or freedom from sensuous distraction.
In its positive sense, Achtung corresponds to reverentia , respect, understood as the freedom to grasp the law as something eminently worthy of adherence, despite its constraining quality. Kant [ 45]; Nancy [ ]; Basterra 91— As the focus of attention and motivation, Achtung is unique in that it is what Kant calls an intellectual affect Kant [ 66].
It has no direct relationship to our bodily make up, which, as we know from Levinas, is indissociably tied up with drives and instincts. When thus motivated, practical reason determines itself to act out of respect for a law indemonstrable by theoretical reason, thereby discovering freedom in the performance of its moral act.
It is only then, post facto , that freedom is found to have reality, through obedience. Whereas for both, the will follows its natural course desires and emotions , something outside it may compel it toward ethical behavior or responsibility. Let us now turn toward the second dilemma: the fraught relationship between ethics and politics. In , Levinas characterizes politics and drives as unfolding in a parallel fashion. Both are sites for the manifestation of the will to persist in being. However, he remarks that justice can be addressed as a demand posed to some States, notably liberal ones.
This does not solve the problem of mediations, yet suggests that it may be misguided. After all, what do the mediations ultimately serve, if not the finality of the State as overarching protector and regulator? In , in his first published article on the State of Israel, he did not hesitate to forestall accusations of idolatry even against a Jewish State. He thereupon added the more existential claim that.
DF: Clearly, this is not an exhaustive solution to the problem of mediations between family or ethnicity and the State or politics. It bears noting that by Levinas will be more generous toward European liberal States, and more willing to trace the genealogy of liberalism back to a Biblical conception of responsibility. Europe is not a simple confluence of two cultural currents.
It is the concreteness where theoretical and biblical wisdom do better than converge. The relation with the other … that is, with peace[,] comes a reason that thematizes, synchronizes, and synthesizes, that thinks a world and reflects on being, concepts necessary for the peace of humanity. The work is not about inner-outer dichotomies, much less cognitive operations, or object-memories of events or things.